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NOTES
TO TELL OR NOT TO TELL? AN ANALYSIS
OF TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES: THE
PARENT-CHILD AND REPORTER'S
PRIVILEGES
The ultimate goal of the adversarial system is to ascertain the
truth.1 Accordingly, the common law advocated the admittance of
all relevant evidence to enable the fact-finder to make an informed
decision. 2 In certain circumstances, the common law and the Fed-
1 See FED. R. EvID. 102. Rule 102 provides that the Federal Rules of Evidence "shall be
construed... to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly deter-
mined." Id.; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (noting testimony of witnesses in judicial process is crucial to further predomi-
nant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth); EDWARD CLEARY, MC-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 170 (3d ed. 1984) (asserting that "the overwhelming major-
ity of all rules of evidence have as their ultimate justification some tendency to promote the
objectives set forward in the conventional witness' oath, the presentation of 'the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth'"); BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 555 (6th ed. 1990) (de-
fining "evidence" as "all the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which
is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved .... That which demonstrates,
makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side
or on the other.").
2 See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192, at 70 (McNaugh-
ton rev. 1961) (1st ed. 1904). Wigmore propounded that "[flor more than three centuries it
has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public has the right to every
man's evidence." Id. He also determined that all have a "general duty to give what testi-
mony one is capable of giving and any exemptions which may exist are distinctly excep-
tional." Id.; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). The Court stated:
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eral Rules of Evidence provide for pertinent information to be ex-
cluded due to superior policy considerations.3 Privileges are one
means of precluding such information from reaching the purview
of the fact-finder.4 At common law, only the attorney-client and
spousal privileges were recognized.5
We have elected to employ an adversary system ... in which the parties contest all
issues before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary
system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be
defeated ifjudgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the
facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system
depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence.
Id.; see also JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE OF THE COMMON LAW
264 (1898) (propounding that practice of admitting all relevant evidence is "a presupposi-
tion involved in the very conception of a rational system of evidence"); Jeffrey Begens, Com-
ment, Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: An Absolute Right or an Absolute Privilege?, 11
U. DAYTON L. REV. 709, 717 (1986) (asserting that legal system functions most effectively
when all relevant evidence is made available).
3 See SPENCER A. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE §§ 21:1 to :43 (6th ed. 1972). There are ex-
ceptions to the policy of admitting all relevant evidence. Id. § 20:1. One such exception is
governed by the evidentiary rules of incompetency. Id. §§ 20:1 to :14. The rules of incompe-
tency reject a witness's testimony on the grounds of unreliability. Id. Such a witness may
be deemed mentally incompetent, or incompetent due to past criminal behavior. Id. It has
been established that:
the public interest is best served by the paramount requirement that all facts relevant
to a litigated issue should be available to the court to the end that the truth may be
ascertained. Thus ordinarily the sanctity of confidence must yield to the necessity of
getting all the facts and it is only in a few rare relationships that the public policy of
protecting the relationship overrides the public policy of unrestricted injury.
Id.
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 defines another instance warranting the exclusion of rele-
vant evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 403. This Rule calls for the exclusion of evidence "if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.; see also M.C. Slough, Relevancy Unrav-
eled, 5 KAN. L. REV. 1, 12-15 (1956) (addressing balancing of probative value and need for
evidence against harm likely to result from its admission); Herman L. Trautman, Logical
or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385, 392 (1952) (same).
4 See EDITH L. FISCH, NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 511, at 334 (2d ed. 1992-93). Privileges are
designed to protect and strengthen certain relationships deemed socially desirable. Id. The
recognition of testimonial privileges, however, often causes the exclusion of clearly relevant
and nonprejudicial evidence. Id. Nevertheless, the courts and legislature deem the social
benefit derived from the protected relationship to outweigh the harm that results from the
exclusion of the evidence. Id.; see also 65 N.Y. Jua. Witnesses § 44 (1969). Testimonial privi-
leges serve as an exception to the generally accepted notion that the public's interest in the
disclosure of facts is paramount to "considerations of inviolability of communications made
in the reliance on personal confidence, on a fiduciary or contract relations." Id.; JACK B.
WEINSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE CASES AND MATERIALS 1348 (8th ed. 1988). The subject of priv-
ileges may be divided into three categories: (1) privileges that have a direct constitutional
basis,such as the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (2) privileges cre-
ated to insure free communication in confidential relationships, such as the attorney-client
privilege; and (3) privileges connected with the effective functioning of governmental insti-
tutions, such as the state secret and official information privileges. Id.
5 Berd v. Lovelace, 21 Eng. Rep. 33, 33 (1577). The first evidentiary privilege recognized
at common law was the protection of communications between attorney and client. Id.;
Dennis v. Codrington, 21 Eng. Rep. 53, 53 (1580). Shortly thereafter, courts began to create
a marital privilege, which was widely accepted in both criminal and civil cases by the late
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Thereafter, various states enacted legislation which created
privileges protecting communications between physicians and pa-
tients;6 psychotherapists and patients;7 and priests and confes-
1600s. Id. Eventually, the common law recognized additional privileges such as priest-
penitent, doctor-patient, as well as, several governmental privileges. Id.; see also In re
Navarro, 155 Cal. Rptr. 522, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). The attorney-client privilege protects
against compelled disclosure of confidential communications between attorneys and cli-
ents. Id.; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege,
66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1065-66 (1978). The testimonial exception is the product of judicial
decisions augmented by statutes. Id. The fundamental purpose of the privilege is to en-
courage open communication between attorneys and clients. See People v. Meredith, 631
P.2d 46, 51 (Cal. 1981). In the absence of a such a privilege, a client will be reluctant to
make full disclosure to his attorney. Id.; EDMUND M. MORGAN, Foreward to AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 24-28 (1942). The privilege is that of the client, thus
the attorney is required to disclose evidence if the client does not object. Id. For a particular
communication to be privileged, it is not necessary that the communication be made di-
rectly to the lawyer. See United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1048
(E.D.N.Y. 1976). The privilege may be maintained if the communication is conveyed to the
lawyer's representatives, such as associates or clerks. Id. For the exceptions to the privi-
lege, see FED. R. EVID. 503(d)(5) (proposed) (1993) (privilege does not apply when attorney
retained by two or more clients and there is resulting litigation between any clients); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon John Doe, Esq. (Slotnick) v. United States, 781 F.2d
238, 247 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (mere identity of client not protected by attorney-client privi-
lege), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (attorney-client privilege inapplicable when client voluntarily discloses confidential
communication to third party); Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975) (com-
munication which is basis of affirmative defense not covered by attorney-client privilege);
Clark v. State, 261 S.W.2d 339, 347 (Tex. Crim. App.) (privilege may not be interposed
when client seeks attorney's advice in furtherance of crime or fraud), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
855 (1953).
At early common law, a spouse was incompetent to testify where the husband or wife was
a party to a judicial proceeding. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980). This
rule resulted from "two canons of medieval jurisprudence": defendants could not testify on
their own behalf due to their interest in the proceeding, and the husband was the dominant
person in the marital relationship. Id. Despite its "medieval roots," the validity of the
spousal disqualification rule remained unchallenged until the mid-nineteenth century. Id.
Currently, the courts recognize two types of spousal privileges. Id. at 53. The first privilege,
known as the "marital privilege" permits a witness-spouse to refuse to testify against the
other spouse in a criminal trial. Id. The second, the "husband-wife" privilege, is available in
both civil and criminal proceedings and protects confidential communications between hus-
band and wife during marriage. See People v. Melski, 10 N.Y.2d 78, 78, 176 N.E.2d 81, 81,
217 N.Y.S.2d 65, 65 (1961); see also N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4502 (McKinney 1993) (hus-
band-wife privilege recognized by New York); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 60.10 (McKinney 1993)
(same). In order to claim the "marital privilege," the parties must be legally married at the
time of trial. See United States v. Bolzer, 556 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1977). In contrast, the
"husband-wife" privilege merely requires the parties to be married at the time of the con-
versation. See In re Vanderbilt, 57 N.Y.2d 66, 66, 439 N.E.2d 378, 378, 453 N.Y.S.2d 662,
662 (1982).
6 Smith, 425 F. Supp. at 1040. The physician-patient testimonial exception did not exist
at common law. Id. Thus, the physician-patient privilege is purely a creature of statute. See
WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2380. The privilege enables patients to prevent disclosure of con-
fidential communications confided in their doctor. See Jones v. Superior Court, 119 Cal.
App. 3d 534, 534 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). The privilege may only be invoked, however, if
the confidential information was necessary for and obtained during the course of treat-
ment. Id. For cases outlining the exceptions to the privilege, see State v. Dyal, 478 A.2d
390, 394 (N.J. 1984) (privilege may not be invoked in criminal cases involving drinking);
Prink v. Rockefeller Center, 48 N.Y.2d 309, 315, 398 N.E.2d 517, 522, 422 N.Y.S.2d 911,
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sors. In the 1970s, Congress proposed to expressly enumerate
such privileges as part of the Federal Rules of Evidence.9 After
much comment and controversy, however, Congress enacted Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 501 ("Rule 501"), which left courts to inter-
pret and create privileges "in the light of reason and experience." 10
Although granted much leeway, courts have typically construed
existing privileges narrowly," and have been reluctant to create
new privileges. 12 Nevertheless, the parent-child and the reporter's
916 (1979) (privilege inapplicable when patient places his physical condition in
controversy).
7 See FED. R. EVID. 504 (proposed) (1993); Subpoena Served Upon Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632,
637 (6th Cir. 1983) (Federal Rule 501 permits recognition of psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege). The privilege is inapplicable in several situations. See id. § 1024 (West 1994) (privi-
lege inapplicable if psychotherapist reasonably believes patients are dangerous to them-
selves or others and disclosure of communication is necessary to prevent threatened
danger); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1026 (West 1994) (psychotherapist-patient privilege inapplica-
ble to information required to be reported to public office).
8 See WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1571 (noting two-thirds of states have enacted
statutes covering confidential communications between priest and penitent). However, the
extent of protection provided by the privilege varies by jurisdiction. See FED. R. EVID. 506
(proposed) (1993). Some states restrict the priest-penitent privilege to communications in
confessionals, whereas others apply the privilege to any confidential communication to a
clergyman in his professional capacity. Id. The priest-penitent privilege is unique in that
both parties may claim the privilege. See Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160, 168, 390
N.E.2d 1151, 1158, 417 N.Y.S.2d 226, 230 (1979).
9 See FED. R. EVID. 502 (proposed) (1993) (reporter's privilege); FED. R. EVID. 503 (pro-
posed) (1993) (lawyer-client privilege); FED. R. EVID. 504 (proposed) (1993) (psychothera-
pist-patient privilege); FED. R. EVID. 505 (proposed) (1993) (husband-wife privilege); FED.
R. EviD. 506 (proposed) (1993) (privilege protecting communications to clergyman); FED. R.
EVID. 507 (proposed) (1993) (privilege to refuse to disclose tenor of vote at political election);
FED. R. EVID. 508 (proposed) (1993) (trade secrets); FED. R. EVID. 509 (proposed) (1993)
(secrets of state and other official information); FED. R. EVID. 510 (proposed) (1993) (privi-
lege to disclose identity of informer).
10 See FED. R. EVID. 501. This rule provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. How-
ever, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, state or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with state law.
Id. Federal common law generally guides the privilege inquiry, except in cases where state
law is controlling as to an element of the claim or defense. Id.
11 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (emphasizing testimonial privi-
leges be strictly construed, and normal predominant principle of all rational means of as-
certaining truth); accord University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 183 (1990)
(noting privileges must be construed narrowly to give effect to federal evidentiary require-
ments); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (same).
12 See WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2192. Dean Wigmore has condemned evidentiary privi-
leges since they are in derogation of the general rule that everyone is obligated to testify
when properly summoned and are an obstacle to the administration of justice. Id.; accord
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 159 (2d ed. 1972) (permitting any privilege functions to halt
search for truth); MORGAN, supra note 5, at 22-30 (same); 97 C.J.S. Witnesses, at 259 (1957);
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privileges have been adopted by courts. The special relationship
existing between parents and children, as well as reporters and
their sources, have thus been accorded privileged status.
This Note focuses on the parent-child privilege, the reporter's
privilege, and the controversy surrounding both. Part One ana-
lyzes the present status of the parent-child privilege under federal
and state law. Part One also examines the constitutional and
public policy justifications supporting the parent-child privilege.
Part Two traces the historical development of the reporter's privi-
lege and examines the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v.
Hayes13 and its effect on the status of the reporter's privilege. Fi-
nally, Part Two examines the circumstances under which the re-
porter's privilege may be defeated.
I. THE PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE
The history of the parent-child privilege can be traced to ancient
Jewish 4 and Roman law,' 5 which barred family members from
testifying against one another. These civilizations believed that
the family was the foundation of society and to allow family mem-
bers to testify against each other would effectively destroy soci-
ety.'6 Similarly, the parent-child privilege is based upon the
spousal privilege, which was created by the English Evidence Act
of 1853.17 Nevertheless, the parent-child privilege, as with other
see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 n.29 (1972) (indicating that creating new
testimonial privileges has been met with disfavor since such privileges obstruct search for
truth); ACLU of Mississippi v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting
'[p]rivileges are strongly disfavored in federal practice").
13 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
14 See Meredith Watts, The Parent-Child Privilege: Hardly a New or Revolutionary Con.
cept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583, 591-92 (1987). Ancient Jewish law deemed it necessary
to protect society, and thus, found that fostering strong familial relationships would be the
most efficient method to bring about this goal. Id. at 591. The Talmud, a compilation of
Jewish law, specifically "forbids a parent from testifying against his or her children." Id. at
591-92; see also In re Greenburg, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 579, 581 n.6 (D. Conn.
1982) (Jewish scholars acknowledge parent-child privilege rule of Jewish faith).
15 See Watts, supra note 14, at 592. The Romans strongly believed that the foundation of
society was the family, and thus recognized the rule of testimonium domesticum. Id. This
rule mandated that parents and children could not be forced to testify against each other.
Id. The rule prevented the erosion of family relations, which the Romans saw as the basis
of society. Id. The Napoleonic Code also prohibited the compelled disclosure of confidences
between family members, commanding that "[n]o one may be required to disclose confi-
dences between himself and a family member." Id. at 593. The familial privilege is also
recognized as part of the law in many other countries including France, West Germany,
and Sweden. Id.
16 See supra notes 14-15.
17 See Betsy Booth, Comment, Underprivileged Communication: The Rationale for a Par-
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newly emerging testimonial privileges, has faced much resistance
by courts and legislators.'i
A. The Federal Law
Rule 501 does not expressly set forth a parent-child privilege.' 9
Rule 501 does, however, allow for federal courts to recognize new
privileges on a case-by-case basis.2 ° Nevertheless, only the Ne-
vada and Connecticut district courts have recognized the parent-
child testimonial privilege. 2 The Nevada District Court, in its
seminal decision, In re Agosto,22 applied an expansive view of Rule
501.23 The court determined that the legislative history of Rule
501 was indicative of Congress's intent to leave courts free to ex-
pand the present law of privileges in order to reach situations
where constitutional protection was deemed critical.24 Therefore,
the court utilized the parent-child privilege to protect an individ-
ent-Child Testimonial Privilege, 36 Sw. L.J. 1175, 1176 (1983) (examining protection af-
forded confidential communications between spouses).
18 See J. Tyson Covey, Note, Making Form Follow Function: Considerations in Creating
and Applying a Statutory Parent-Child Privilege, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 879, 880-83 (1990).
The author asserts that "[the majority of commentary and serious consideration of the
privilege has occurred over the past ten to fifteen years, therefore it is difficult to under-
stand why the parent-child privilege received little attention in the United States prior to
1970." Id. Even with this limited recognition of the parent-child privilege, the Criminal
Defense Committee of the American Bar Association has been preparing and revising a
model parent-child privilege statute since 1983. Id. at 880. This trend is due to the unique
nature of testimonial privileges. Id.; see also WIGMORE, supra note 2. Testimonial privileges
work against the full disclosure of facts, which has been recognized as the foundation of
evidence law. Id.
19 See supra note 10 (discussing effect of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 upon adopting
new privileges).
20 See id.
21 See In re Greenburg, 11 Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 579, 582-84 (D. Conn. 1982) (hold-
ing that Jewish parent may refuse to testify against child); In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298,
1325 (D. Nev. 1983) (holding that child may refuse to testify against parent).
22 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983).
23 Id. at 1325. In this instance, the court was faced with a motion to quash a grand jury
subpoena ad testificandum, or in the alternative, for a protective order. Id. at 1299. Charles
Agosto requested such relief to prevent his testimony from being utilized as evidence
against his father. Id. The court examined law and policy considerations in an area of the
law deemed undeveloped. Id. at 1299-1300. When addressing the extent Rule 501 allows
for the adoption of new testimonial privileges, the court relied upon the scholarly analysis
of Professor Thomas Krattenmaker. Id. at 1322 (citing Thomas Krattenmaker, Interper-
sonal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach,
64 GEO. L.J. 613 (1975-76)).
24 Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1325. For evidence of Congress's intent to leave the courts to a
case-by-case determination of whether or not to recognize a new testimonial privilege, see
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7058;
H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075,
7082; see 120 CONG. REC. H12253-54 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate)
(asserting that Rule 501 was to give courts flexibility in developing rules).
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ual's right to privacy.25
Although the Agosto court recognized the need for a parent-
child privilege, the majority of federal courts have refused to adopt
such a privilege.26 Similarly, no circuit court has adopted a par-
ent-child privilege, although three circuit courts have implied the
possible recognition of a privilege if federal, rather than state law,
controlled the case,27 or if the issue simply arose under a different
factual situation.2" It appears that federal courts are adopting a
narrow construction of Rule 501 and are reluctant to create new
testimonial privileges.
B. State Law
Although the parent-child privilege was not recognized at com-
mon law,29 Idaho,3 ° Minnesota 31 and Massachusetts 32 enacted
25 Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1325.
26 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings of John Doe, 842 F.2d 244, 248 (10th Cir.)
(rejecting child's attempt to assert parent-child testimonial privilege in regard to testimony
against mother), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894 (1988); United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893,
900 (7th Cir.) (rejecting use of parent-child privilege by defendant's daughter), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1008 (1985); In re Santarelli, 740 F.2d 816, 817 (11th Cir. 1984) (denying appel-
lant's motion to quash grand jury subpoena after appellant asserted parent-child privilege);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Starr), 647 F.2d 511, 512-13 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding no
federal judicial support or recognition to prevent child from testifying against mother and
stepfather); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876, 885 (9th Cir.) (expressing that there is no
judicially or legislatively recognized general family privilege), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903
(1980).
27 See Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 1985). The court indicated that defend-
ant's father and stepmother would have been excused from testifying against him, if fed-
eral law, rather than Texas law applied. Id.
28 See United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1985) (declining to address
whether parent-child privilege should be adopted in situations involving unemancipated
minors); United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817, 819 (4th Cir. 1982) (implying parent-child
privilege may be applicable in different factual setting).
29 See People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 714, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311 (Sup. Ct. West-
chester County 1979) (stating that no parent-child privilege existed at common law); see
also People v. Harrell, 87 A.D.2d 21, 24, 450 N.Y.S.2d 501, 504 (2d Dep't 1982) (same).
30 See IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (Supp. 1985). The code provides:
Any parent, guardian or legal custodian shall not be forced to disclose any communica-
tion made by their minor child or ward concerning [matters] in any civil or criminal
action to which such child or ward is a party ... [except] this section does not apply to a
civil action or proceeding by one against the other nor to a criminal action or proceed-
ing for a crime committed by violence of one against the person of the other, nor does
this section apply to any case of physical injury to a minor child where the injury has
been caused as a result of physical abuse or neglect by one or both of the parents,
guardian or legal custodian.
Id.
31 See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(j) (West 1993). The statute provides:
A parent or the parent's minor child may not be examined as to any communication
made in confidence by the minor to the minor's parent. A communication is confiden-
tial if made out of the presence of persons not members of the child's immediate family
living in the same household .... This exception does not apply to a civil action or
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legislation adopting such a privilege. In Idaho and Minnesota, the
state cannot compel parents to reveal communications of their mi-
nor children in criminal or civil proceedings.33 These statutes,
however, do not afford privileged status to a communication be-
tween parent and child because the states' primary concern is to
encourage children to seek support from their parents. 4
Unlike Idaho and Minnesota, the Massachusetts legislature en-
acted a limited parent-child privilege, which disqualified minor
children from testifying against their parents in criminal proceed-
ings.35 The enactment was in response to the Massachusetts
Supreme Court's decision in Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth.3 6
In Three Juveniles, the court held that the defendant's children
could be compelled to testify against their father in his murder
trial.
Notwithstanding the few states that recognize a parent-child
privilege, most state courts have refused to adopt the privilege."
proceeding by one spouse against the other or by a parent or child against the other...
nor a criminal action or proceeding in which the parent is charged with a crime com-
mitted against the person or property of the communicating child... nor to any other
action or proceeding on a petition alleging child abuse, child neglect, abandonment or
nonsupport by a parent.
Id.
32 See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 20 (Law. Co-op. 1993) (adopting parent-child
privilege).
33 See supra notes 30-31 (discussing parent-child privilege under Idaho and Minnesota
law).
34 See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(j) (West 1992) (restricting privilege to communica-
tions made "in confidence" to immediate family members); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 20
(Law. Co-op. 1993) (extending privilege to child, rather than parent, so that state cannot
compel children to divulge communications made from their parents); see also Begens,
supra note 2, at 717 (acknowledging that Minnesota and Massachusetts do not recognize
privilege in child abuse cases or when parent and child are opposing parties in legal
proceeding).
35 See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 20 (Law. Co-op. 1993) (denying parents privilege to
decline to testify against their minor child).
36 455 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984).
37 See Three Juveniles, 455 N.E.2d at 1203; see also Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Tes-
timonial Privilege, 100 HAv. L. REv. 910, 913 n.18 (1987) [hereinafter Loyalty & Privi-
lege]. The legislature enacted this privilege in an effort to prevent such an unjust result
from ever occurring again. Id. Thus, the legislature accomplished its goal, disqualifying
children from testifying against their parents in a criminal proceeding, without having to
extend the privilege to parents as well. Id.
38 See, e.g., Hope v. State, 449 So. 2d 1315, 1319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (denying to
accord privileged status to father-son relationship); Cissna v. State, 352 N.E.2d 793, 795
(Ind. 1976) (stating that no privilege conferred upon parent-child relationship); State v.
Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d 513, 518 (Iowa 1981) (same); State v. Willoughby, 532 A.2d 1020, 1021(Me. 1987) (asserting no parent-child privilege exists and parents held in contempt for re-
fusing to testify against son); People v. Dixon, 411 N.W.2d 760, 763 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)(refusing to adopt parent-child privilege); In re Gail D., 525 A.2d 337, 340 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1987) (same); State v. Maxon, 756 P.2d 1297, 1302 (Wash. 1988) (same).
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Some states reason that such a privilege would be an exception to
the general rule that all evidence must be available in the search
for truth and, thus, a parent-child privilege should be discour-
aged.39 Other states, rejecting the privilege, have asserted that
the "Wigmore test"40 was not satisfied.
41
It is well established that testimonial privileges serve to protect
certain desirable relationships. 42 Dean John Wigmore developed a
test consisting of four fundamental conditions to aid in determin-
ing whether testimonial privileges, such as the parent-child privi-
lege, should be recognized as a matter of public policy. 43 For a tes-
timonial privilege to be recognized, the Wigmore test provides
that the communication must be made in confidence; such confi-
dence must be necessary for the relations between the parties; the
community must recognize the relationship as one which should
be encouraged; and finally, the disclosure of the communications
must bring forth greater harm to the relationship than the benefit
which emanates from the proper disposal of litigation.44
Wigmore reasoned that privileged relationships hold certain
characteristics in common which distinguish them as deserving
privileged status.4 5 He also asserted that denying privileged sta-
39 See Dixon, 411 N.W.2d at 763 (all privileges are exceptional and should be discour-
aged); Gail D., 525 A.2d at 337 (same).
40 See WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2285.
41 See Maxon, 756 P.2d at 1301. The Maxon court claimed that the parent-child privilege
failed to satisfy Wigmore's postulate. Id. Further, the court stated that the concern of los-
ing evidence outweighed public policy favoring a parent-child privilege. Id.
42 See supra notes 3-9 (emphasizing that special relationships exist warrant protection
through testimonial privileges).
43 See WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2285. For New York courts which support using the
Wigmore test to establish a parent-child privilege, In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 434, 403
N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (4th Dep't 1978) (acknowledging that although courts may establish par-
ent-child privilege, legislature should codify same); In re Gloria L., 124 Misc. 2d 50, 50, 475
N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1001-02 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1984) (although Wigmore test satisfied,
application of privilege denied on procedural grounds); see also Larry M. Bauer, Comment,
Recognition of a Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, 23 ST. Louis U. L.J. 676, 688 (1979)
(maintaining that "parent-child privilege easily satisfies Wigmore's four criteria"); Patrick
Koepp, Comment, Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: Its Present Existence, Whether it
Should Exist, and to What Extent, 13 CAP. U. L. REV. 555, 602 (1984) (same); Bruce N.
Lemons, Comment, From the Mouths of Babes: Does the Constitutional Right of Privacy
Mandate a Parent-Child Privilege?, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1002, 1010 (1978) (asserting that
parent-child privilege meets requirements of Wigmore's test); see, e.g., Ann M. Stanton,
Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential Communications: An Examination and Proposal, 16
FAm. L.Q. 1, 13 (1982) (parent-child privilege should be recognized in light of Wigmore's
standard).
44 See WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 527 (declaring that "[o]nly if these four conditions are
present should a privilege be recognized").
45 See id.; see also Covey, supra note 18 (expounding Wigmore's rationale for developing
four-prong test).
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tus to certain relationships was justifiable because these relation-
ships lack one or more of the identified conditions.4 6 Wigmore's
test, therefore, demands that these four conditions serve as the
foundation for ascertaining the existence of all privileges.4 7
After examining the issue in light of Wigmore's postulate, the
parent-child privilege should undoubtedly be accepted because it
satisfies each condition of the Wigmore test.48 The parent-child re-
lationship is one which by its very nature is founded and main-
tained upon an aura of confidence.49 Moreover, children rely on
their parents for guidance throughout their lives, and if a parent
were to betray this confidence, irreparable damage would result to
the child's development 50 and the parent-child relationship. 51
Likewise, New York courts have determined that the parent-child
relationship demands recognition as a testimonial privilege.
C. Judicial Recognition of the Parent-Child Privilege in New
York
Although New York does not have a statutorily created parent-
child privilege,52 such a privilege has been judicially recognized.5 3
46 See WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 527.
47 See id.; see also supra note 43 (discussing support of Wigmore test to establish parent-
child privilege from courts and scholars).
48 See id.
49 See Begens, supra note 2, at 721 (asserting that confidentiality is essential to mainte-
nance of parent-child relationship); Daniel R. Coburn, Child-Parent Communications:
Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 DicK. L. REv. 599, 623 (1970) (contending "[it] is
difficult to imagine a relationship which, by its inherent nature, spawns communications of
a confidential nature with a greater degree of frequency"); Watts, supra note 14, at 608
(averring parent-child relations "breed" confidential communications).
50 See Begens, supra note 2, at 722. Research indicates that the lack of parental interac-
tion with a child can lead to abnormal behavior. Id.
51 See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1326 (D. Nev. 1983). The Agosto court professed:
To damage the parent-child relationship would result in damage to the child's relation-
ship to society as a whole. In an age in which Americans bemoan the lack of loyalty or
sense of responsibility which some family members seem to exhibit toward one an-
other, resulting in massive government support programs, it is paradoxical that, on the
other hand, the government seeks to employ information-gathering tactics which fur-
ther undermine the integrity and supportive structure of the family unit.
Id.
52 See People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 714, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311 (Westchester
County Ct. 1979). Although the New York legislature has not enacted the parent-child priv-
ilege, several common law privileges have been codified. See N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4501
(McKinney 1993) (privilege against self-incrimination); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4502 (Mc-
Kinney 1993) (marital privilege); N.Y. Civ. PPAc. L. & R. § 4503 (McKinney 1993) (attor-
ney-client privilege). Furthermore, New York has enacted additional privileges not based
on the common law. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 4504 (McKinney 1993) (physician-patient
privilege); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4505 (McKinney 1993) (clergy-penitent privilege); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4507 (McKinney 1993) (psychologist-patient privilege); N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
L. & R. § 4508 (McKinney 1993) (social worker-client privilege); N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS § 79-h
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In In re A & M,5 4 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, re-
viewed whether the constitutionally protected right to privacy ex-
tended to parent-child communications.55 The court found that
the "integrity of the family relational interests [was] clearly enti-
tled to constitutional protection."56 Writing for the court, Justice
M. Delores Denman recognized the State's goal of obtaining all
relevant facts to detect and prosecute criminal behavior.5 7 Justice
Denman posited, however, that a parent-child communication
would be privileged because the societal benefit in fostering par-
ent-child relations outweighed the State's interest in compelling
the disclosure of facts.58 The privilege would be established if it
(McKinney 1993) (journalist privilege).
53 WILLIAM P. RICHARDSON, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 455-A, at 200 (10th ed. & Supp.
1973) (stating that no parent-child privilege was created by New York's legislature); FISCH,
supra note 4, § 751, at 288 (same).
54 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (4th Dep't 1978).
55 Id. at 428, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 377. The question before the court was one of first impres-
sion in New York State. Id. The District Attorney of Erie County was investigating an
alleged arson which occurred at a nearby college. Id. Several witnesses identified a sixteen
year old child near the scene of the arson. Id. The district attorney subsequently issued
subpoenas to the child's parents. Id. The district attorney was allegedly seeking evidence,
in the form of admissions, which may have been made by the child to his parents. Id. The
trial court granted a motion to quash the subpoena based upon the notion that the commu-
nications between a child and parent were protected under New York's marital privilege.
Id. Although the Appellate Division refused to expand the marital privilege, the court did
conclude that the communications could be shielded from disclosure. Id. at 429, 403
N.Y.S.2d at 378. Addressing the need for a parent-child privilege, the court noted:
It would be difficult to think of a situation which more strikingly embodies the inti-
mate and confidential relationship which exists among family members than that in
which a troubled young person, perhaps beset with remorse and guilt, turns for coun-
sel and guidance to his mother and father. There is nothing more natural, more consis-
tent with our concept of the parental role, than that a child may rely on his parents for
help and advice. Shall it be said to those parents "Listen to your son at the risk of being
compelled to testify about his confidences?"
Id.
56 Id. at 432, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380. The court's decision was influenced by the United
States Supreme Court decision in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). Id. The
Moore Court propounded that the Constitution protects "the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition.
It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished val-
ues, moral and cultural." See Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04.
57 A & M, 61 A.D.2d at 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380. The law of evidence is based upon the
full disclosure of facts which assist in ascertaining the truth. Id.
58 Id. at 432, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380. The court utilized a balancing test since competing
interests were involved. Id. The court weighed the state's interest in full disclosure of all
relevant facts, against the parent's right to privacy. Id. Although society's interest in pro-
tecting parent-child relations was considered to outweigh the state's quest for the truth,
the court permitted the parent's testimony. Id. at 436, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 382. However, the
court limited the scope of the interrogation to questions which did not invade the family's
privacy. Id.
The right to family privacy has been posited by several commentators. See Ellen
Kandoian, The Parent Child Privilege and the Parent Child Crime: Observations on State v.
Delong and In re Agosto, 36 ME. L. REV. 59, 77 (1984) (examining constitutional support for
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was found that the confidential information was revealed by the
child solely for the purpose of seeking guidance or support from
his parents. 59
Since In re A & M, many New York courts have acknowledged
the parent-child privilege.60 In People v. Fitzgerald,61 the West-
chester County Court expanded the existing parent-child privilege
to prevent the State from forcing the disclosure of confidential
communications between a parent and child regardless of the
child's age. 62 The court found the sanctity and privacy of the fam-
ily to constitute a fundamental right which should be protected by
the United States Constitution.6 3 The court professed that the
family's right to privacy was fundamentally ingrained in "our his-
parent-child privilege); Marianne E. Scott, Comment, Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege:
Preserving and Protecting the Fundamental Right to Family Privacy, 52 U. CIN. L. REv.
901, 920 (1983) (recommending parent-child privilege because it "comports with the consti-
tutional right to family privacy"); Stanton, supra note 43, at 56 (maintaining need for par-
ent-child privilege and suggesting statutory enactment).
59 In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426,435, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (4th Dep't 1978). The family is
crucial in establishing a child's emotional stability, character, and self-image. Id. at 432,
403 N.Y.S.2d at 380. Child psychologists and behavioral scientists recognize that children
must be encouraged to communicate with their parents in an atmosphere of privacy, trust,
and understanding. Id.
60 See In re Michelet P., 70 A.D.2d 68, 74, 419 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2d Dep't 1979) (deem-
ing statement made by child to legal guardian who was present as result of notification of
peace officer pursuant to Family Court Act section 724 as privileged); In re Gloria L., 124
Misc. 2d 50, 53, 475 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1002 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1984) (acknowledging
parent-child privilege, yet privilege did not apply because witness must appear and be
questioned before asserting privilege); In re Ryan, 123 Misc. 2d 854, 854-55, 474 N.Y.S.2d
931, 931-32 (Family Ct. Monroe County 1984) (recognizing parent-child privilege in juve-
nile delinquency proceedings where juvenile's statements were made to grandmother with
whom he had permanently resided almost all of his life); see also People v. Edwards, 135
A.D.2d 556, 557, 521 N.Y.S.2d 778, 779 (2d Dep't 1987) (accepting parent-child privilege,
however, not found where it was neither "raised at the suppression hearing nor cited as a
ground for objection to the admission of the evidence at trial"); In re Summers G., 111
A.D.2d 891, 892, 491 N.Y.S.2d 29, 29 (2d Dep't 1985) (declining to apply privilege because
witness must appear); People v. Gloskey, 105 A.D.2d 871, 872, 482 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (3d
Dep't 1984) (parent-child privilege recognized, although denied on grounds that father ini-
tially expressed no desire to remain silent, nor did conversation have aura of
confidentiality).
61 101 Misc. 2d 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester County Ct. 1979).
62 Id. at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 310. The court found the privilege existed, "grounded in
law, logic, morality, and ethics." Id. In this instance, a twenty-three year old man was tried
for criminally negligent homicide. Id. Defendant confided in his father that he was involved
in the incident. Id. at 714, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 310. Defendant's father was subpoenaed to be a
witness, and his counsel moved to preclude the compelled testimony on grounds that the
conversation was protected by the parent-child privilege. Id. at 714, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 310-
11.
63 Id. at 716, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 312 (finding parent-child communications must remain
confidential and private without interference from state); see also A & M, 61 A.D.2d at 432,
403 N.Y.S.2d at 380 (holding that parent-child relations clearly fall within constitutional
protection); Michelet P., 70 A.D.2d at 75, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 709 (same).
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tory and tradition."64
These cases have laid the foundation for future courts to recog-
nize the parent-child testimonial privilege on constitutional
grounds. Thus, the New York Court of Appeals should review the
parent-child privilege and establish a uniform rule for the lower
courts to follow. Further, the New York Legislature should enact
legislation, as has been proposed in the past, to codify the parent-
child privilege.6 5
D. Arguments Supporting Establishment of the Parent-Child
Privilege
1. The Constitutional Right to Privacy
The argument set forth in New York justifying the parent-child
privilege is an old concept.66 As explained in Fitzgerald, the par-
ent-child relationship clearly falls within the ambit of the right to
privacy.6' The right to privacy has been expounded upon since
1886, when the United States Supreme Court construed a right of
privacy in both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.6 These cen-
tury-old cases have, therefore, laid the groundwork for recognizing
a parent-child privilege.
In 1923, the Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy
within the family setting in Meyer v. Nebraska.69 The Meyer Court
stated, that under the Constitution, the family was an autono-
mous unit that should be free of undue state interference.7 ° In his
decision, Justice James McReynolds posited that parents have a
right to direct the education of their children.71 Additionally, in
64 See Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d at 716, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 312 (finding that these rights
were 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal" (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))).
65 See N.Y.S. 9965, 203d Sess. (1980); N.Y.A. 8502, 204th Sess. (1981).
66 See supra notes 14-15 (commenting that notions of parent-child privilege established
under ancient laws).
67 See supra notes 62-64.
68 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); cf. Andresen v. Maryland, 427
U.S. 463, 477 (1976) (limiting privacy granted by Fourth and Fifth Amendments); see also
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (19281 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (claiming
"[The Framers of the Constitution] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and right most valued by civilized men"); Samuel
Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 193 (1890) (asserting
right to privacy as 'the right to be left alone").
69 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
70 Id. at 399.
71 Id. at 401. The Court struck down a statute prohibiting the teaching of a foreign lan-
guage before the student reached the eighth grade. Id. at 402.
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Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 2 the Supreme Court held that parents
have a constitutionally protected right to decide whether or not to
send their children to public school.73 Lastly, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,74 the Supreme Court noted that history and Western civili-
zation have75 acknowledged that the primary role of parents is to
nurture and raise their children.76
Each of these cases protected the right of parents to assume the
primary role in decisions concerning child-rearing. The Supreme
Court has, therefore, supported the proposition that there is a
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."77 The
"private realm," includes those areas in which state intrusion
would interfere with the integrity of the family.78 Case law dem-
onstrates that a state should not force parents to testify against
their children because this constitutes an invasion of the familial
right to privacy. As such, it is inconceivable that the right to pri-
vacy, evidenced by these decisions, does not pertain to the privacy
of the family unit with regard to the parent-child privilege.
2. Family Unity
The importance of family relations79 and the protection of peace
and harmony within the family unit have been emphasized
through court decisions and commentaries.8 0 The family is the
72 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
73 Id. at 534-35. At issue in Pierce, was an Oregon statute that required children be-
tween the ages of eight and sixteen to attend public schools. Id. at 530. The Court found
that "[tihe fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to ac-
cept instruction from public teachers only." Id. at 535.
74 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 232. The Court upheld the right of Amish parents to refuse to send their chil-
dren to public schools after the eighth grade. Id.
77 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (affording parents right to rear
children and thus protecting those areas considered within zone of privacy); see also Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681 (1977) (protecting right to buy nonprescription
contraceptives); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (protecting right
to abortion without parental consent); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972) (pro-
tecting right to purchase nonprescription contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (same).
78 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 550-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing "Con-
stitution protects the privacy of the home against all unreasonable intrusion"); In re A & M,
61 A.D.2d 426, 430, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (4th Dep't 1978) (asserting that compelled dis-
closure constitutes invasion of privacy).
79 See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text (explaining evolution of family right to
privacy through Supreme Court precedence).
80 See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977). The Smith Court
explained:
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most influential factor in a child's development.8 ' Commentators
have further recognized that positive family interaction is signifi-
cant in preventing juvenile delinquency and promoting well-ad-
justed children with positive self-images. 2 Thus, it is apparent
that society has a strong interest in fostering open communica-
tions between parents and children.
The forced disclosure of confidential parent-child communica-
tions carries many negative consequences. Although the state will
have access to all relevant facts, children may become suspicious
of the legal system and society in general.83 Additionally, children
may lose respect for two valuable aspects of their lives: their par-
ents and family.84 When the state compels disclosure from parents
regarding confidential communications, parents are faced with
the strong competing demands of parental loyalty and legal
authority. 5
Parents have two alternatives to succumbing to the state's
wishes.8 6 First, a parent-witness may be subjected to contempt
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the
society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily
association and from the role it plays in "promot[ing] a way of life" through the instruc-
tion of children ....
Id.
81 See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (D. Nev. 1983); Robert E. Furlong, Youthful
Marriage and Parenthood: A Threat to Family Stability, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 105, 105 (1967).
The family is relied upon to "nurture the young." Id. at 115. Furthermore, the family is
critical to the "production, preparation, and guidance" of children in developing the "neces-
sary and proper moral, social, and interpersonal framework of our society." Id. Therefore,
when the family "fails and denigrates, so shall our society ... fail and denigrate." Id. at
106. Studies of growth and development of children and of adults in society show a correla-
tion between an individual's functioning in society and the quality of the relationship
within the family. Id. at 115. Moreover, statistical studies of delinquency, crime, suicide,
and mental illness establish that societal issues are closely associated with damaging rela-
tionships in failing families. Id.
82 See Susan Levine, Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 771, 782-83 (1979) (children reared by parents who emphasize two-way communica-
tion and are involved in family decision-making adjust well to society); see also Agosto, 553
F. Supp. at 1304 (open communication has therapeutic value within familial relationships);
ROBERT C. TROJANOWICZ, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CONCEPTs AND CONTROL 68-69 (2d ed.
1978) (summarizing studies show physical or erratic disciplinary practices contribute to
delinquent behavior).
83 See Coburn, supra note 49, at 628-29.
84 Id. at 625. If children are aware that their parents may be forced to disclose confiden-
tial communications, they will be unwilling to confide in their parents. Id.
85 See Loyalty & Privilege, supra note 37, at 921 (observing that persons called upon to
reveal information conveyed to them in confidence are placed in painful conflict between
government's demands and familial loyalties).
86 See Coburn, supra note 49, at 629 (parent witnesses must decide between conflicting
interests); Loyalty & Privilege, supra note 37, at 921 (same); Watts, supra note 14, at 613
(setting forth examination of "witnesses' dilemma").
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proceedings for refusing to testify. 7 Secondly, the parent-witness
may testify, but lie in an effort to protect the child.8 Recognition
of a parent-child privilege would serve to remedy the dilemma
faced by parents called to testify against their children by effec-
tively removing the burden of choosing between these competing
interests.
3. Support from Two Currently Recognized Privileges
Parent-child confidential communications should be afforded
privileged status because of the similarities between the parent-
child relationship and those relationships currently recognized
under testimonial privileges."9 In particular, the parent-child re-
lationship encompasses aspects of the relations between psycho-
therapists and their patients.9 0 This privilege usually protects the
confidentiality of highly personal and embarrassing communica-
tions made by the patient for the purpose of treatment for mental
or emotional conditions.9 Because of the nature of this relation-
ship, the need to protect the privacy and confidentiality of the
communications was recognized as a prerequisite to its success.92
87 See, e.g., John Doe v. United States, 842 F.2d 244, 245 (10th Cir.) (affirming district
court order holding fifteen year old minor in contempt for refusing to testify against mother
or other family members), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894 (1988); United States v. Jones, 683
F.2d 817, 818 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding son in contempt for refusing to answer grand jury
questions about his father); State v. DeLong, 456 A.2d 877, 877 (Me. 1983) (upholding con-
tempt conviction of seventeen year old who refused to testify against her father).
88 See United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1256 (6th Cir. 1985). In Ismail, defend-
ant's son was forced to tesify against the defendant. Id. When the prosecutor learned that
the son had lied, the child was forced to testify again. Id. This situation resulted in the
child's contemplation of suicide. Id.
89 See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1303 (D. Nev. 1983) (analogizing parent-child
privilege with psychotherapist-patient and marital privileges); Levine, supra note 81, at
780 (same); Watts, supra note 14, at 608-09 (same); see also Begens, supra note 2, at 727
(examining parent-child privilege through analogy with professional privilege); Koepp,
supra note 43, at 564 (same).
90 See supra notes 7 & 88 (applying psychotherapist-patient privilege to parent-child
privilege).
91 See FED. R. EVID. 504(b) (proposed) (1993). This rule would provide:
A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing confidential communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or treat-
ment of his mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, among himself,
his psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment
under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members of his family.
Id.
92 See Levine, supra note 82, at 779 (acknowledging important role confidentiality plays
in maintenance of parent-child relationship); see also Robert M. Fisher, Psychotherapeutic
Professions and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 611 (1964)
(alleging disclosure of confidences may destroy psychotherapeutic relationship with patient
and circumvent sensitive relations with other patients); David W. Louiselle, The Psycholo-
gist in Today's Legal World, 41 MINN. L. REV. 731, 745-46 (1957) (successful therapy re-
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Similarly, when children are faced with a serious problem and
are unsure about how to handle themselves, their first reaction is
usually to seek assistance and advice from their parents.93 Be-
cause children are inclined to confide in their parents, there exists
a need for the free flow of highly personal information.94 It is illog-
ical that children must seek a professional psychotherapist's
assistance, rather than parental assistance, in order for such com-
munications to remain privileged.
In addition, the marital privilege supports the adoption of the
parent-child privilege because the relationships within each privi-
lege parallel one another.95 The marital privilege, like the parent-
child privilege, is highly dependent upon the protection of commu-
nications.96 The relationships are founded upon shared love, fond-
ness, intimacy, and trust.97 Both relationships also aid in the pro-
motion of the family institution.98 Society has recognized the need
to nurture the marital bond in an effort to foster and preserve har-
mony and tranquility between spouses.99 Society, likewise, values
the parent-child relationship,'00 and the recognition of such a
privilege unquestionably strengthens family harmony and
quires utmost trust between patient and psychotherapist).
93 See In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 434, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (4th Dep't 1978) (consis-
tent with parental role that children seek guidance and advice from parents); see also Peo-
ple v. Harrell, 87 A.D.2d 21, 24, 450 N.Y.S.2d 501,503 (2d Dep't 1982) (stating that "[w]hen
a minor is arrested for a crime it is only natural, that in the first instance, he should regard
his parents, rather than a lawyer, as a source of assistance and advice"), affd, 59 N.Y.2d
620, 449 N.E.2d 1263 (1983).
94 See Stanton, supra note 43, at 13 (asserting that "every person needs the opportunity
for intimate and trusting relationships in which highly personal information can be freely
communicated").
95 See Levine, supra note 82, at 781 (common elements of marital and parent-child rela-
tionships support adoption of parent-child privilege); see also Koepp, supra note 43, at 564
(analogizing marital relationship and parent-child relationship); Watts, supra note 14, at
602 (noting similarities between parent-child and marital relationships).
96 See Levine, supra note 82, at 781 (noting marital relationship warrants protection).
97 See id. (expressing that mutual love, affection, and intimacy are aspects shared by
both marital and parent-child relationships).
98 See Begens, supra note 2, at 729 (marital and parent-child relationships based on
"trust and confidence" and establish "vital family institution"); Watts, supra note 14, at 597
(discussing basis for marital privilege as promoting trust and reliance between spouses).
99 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980) (rationale for marital privilege
'perceived role in fostering harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship"); Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Esser, 96 Misc. 2d 567, 568, 409 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1978) (marital privilege purports to preserve peace, confidence, and tranquility be-
tween spouses); see also RICHARDSON, supra note 53, § 447, at 402 (justification for marital
privilege avoiding "feeling of indelicacy and want of decorum" that would arise from requir-
ing persons to condemn their spouse).
100 See supra notes 66-77 (discussing Supreme Court recognition that parent-child com-
munications be afforded constitutional protection).
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tranquility.101
It has been established that the parent-child relationship, by its
very nature, warrants privileged status. Justification for such
recognition has been seen through the protection of the constitu-
tional right to familial privacy. Public policy not only favors the
recognition of a parent-child privilege, but demands such recogni-
tion. The parent-child privilege enables the family institution to
grow, and in turn, strengthens the love and mutual trust between
the parent and child. Another extraordinary relationship war-
ranting recognition as a testimonial privilege is that between re-
porters and their sources.
II. THE REPORTER'S PRIVLEGE
A. The Historical Development of the Newsgatherer's Privilege
At common law, courts consistently rejected the contention that
the First Amendment 10 2 provided protection to reporters from dis-
closing their confidential sources. 10 3 Courts were not compelled to
101 See United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1985). The Sixth Circuit
stated: "Analogous to the spousal privilege, the parent-child privilege purportedly would
serve the public interest in preserving the harmony and confidentiality of the parent-child
relationship." Id.
102 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in relevant part:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
Id.
103 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668 (1972) (noting reporter's privilege not
accepted at common law); William v. American Broadcasting Co., 96 F.R.D. 658, 662 (W.D.
Ark. 1983) ("it is now universally conceded that there was no journalistic privilege at com-
mon law."); Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439, 440 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (following other
jurisdictions tendency to deny reporter's privilege), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 901 (1971); Brew-
ster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416, 416 (S.D. Mass. 1957) (noting that no
American jurisdiction has recognized reporter's privilege absent statutory creation); Ex
parte Lawrence, 48 P. 124, 125 (Cal. 1897) (reporters required to disclose identity of sources
during investigation of state senate); Joslyn v. People, 184 P. 375, 377 (Co. 1919) (reporter
may not refuse to testify regarding confidential sources); Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117, 120
(Fla. 1950) ("Members of the journalistic profession do not enjoy the privilege of confiden-
tial communication, as between themselves and their informants, and are under the same
duty to testify,... as any other person."); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 70 S.E. 781, 783 (Ga. 1911)
(mere fact that communication made in confidence does not give rise to testimonial privi-
lege); In re Grunow, 85 A. 1011, 1012 (N.J. 1913) (reporter's privilege viewed as detrimen-
tal to due administration of law); People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 295, 199
N.E. 415, 416 (1936) (reporters called as witnesses before grand jury may not refuse to
answer pertinent questions relating to communications made to them in newsgathering
capacity); Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 562 P.2d 791, 799 (Idaho) ("There can be little
dispute that the common law recognized no privilege which would support a newspaper or
reporter in refusing, upon proper demand, to disclose information received in confidence."),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977).
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create a reporter's privilege because the judiciary believed that
the public's interest in the due administration of law outweighed
private considerations existing between journalists and their
sources. 104 Courts also believed that such a privilege encouraged
journalists to "invent the news."1°5
Initially, there were few instances where reporters sought First
Amendment protection from disclosure.' Prior to the 1960s,
there were only seventeen cases involving a newsgatherer's privi-
lege. 107 As the number of subpoenas substantially increased dur-
ing the late 1960s and early 1970s, the number of cases in which
reporters claimed a testimonial privilege increased proportion-
ately.' O8 In 1972, the Supreme Court, in Branzburg v. Hayes,'0 9
addressed the issue of whether the First Amendment conferred a
104 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665 (interests served by grand jury investigations out-
weigh reporters' interests in maintaining confidential relationships); Adams, 46 F.R.D. at
441 (reporters' private concerns must yield to public interest in permitting grand juries to
ascertain truth); Clein, 52 So. 2d at 120 (noting that canon of journalistic ethics forbidding
disclosure of newspaper's source must yield to interests of justice).
105 See William W. Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Free Press: A Comment
on Some New Trends and Some Old Theories, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 16 (1980) (asserting
reporter's privilege may tempt reporters to invent news due to greater immunity from hav-
ing to validate articles).
106 See Glenn A. Browne, Just Between You and Me... For Now: Reexamining a Quali-
fied Privilege for Reporters to Keep Sources Confidential in Grand Jury Proceedings, 1988
U. ILL. L. REV. 739, 739. Between 1911 and 1968, there were only seventeen cases in which
the issue of whether the First Amendment afforded reporters a special privilege of nondis-
closure arose. Id. For cites to these cases, see Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958) (asserting First Amendment reporter's privilege in civil
litigation); In re Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (same); Deltec, Inc. v. Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 788, 789 (N.D. Ohio 1960) (same); Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99
F. Supp. 629, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (asserting privilege in grand jury proceeding); see also
Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416, 416 (S.D. Mass. 1957) (privilege
asserted in libel action); Ex parte Howard, 289 P.2d 537, 538 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955)(privilege asserted in civil context); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 70 S.E. 781, 782 (Ga. 1911) (re-
porter refused to testify before City Board of Police Commissioners claiming reporter's priv-
ilege); In re Goodfader, 367 P.2d 472, 476 (Haw. 1961) (asserting privilege in civil case);
Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Print & Pub. Co., 197 A.2d 416, 419 (N.J. 1964) (privilege as-
serted in libel action); State v. Donovan, 30 A.2d 421,483 (N.J. 1943) (asserting privilege in
criminal prosecution); In re Grunow, 85 A. 1011, 1012 (N.J. 1913) (privilege asserted in
contempt action); State v. Buchanan, 436 P.2d 729, 730 (Or.) (student writer's contention
that First Amendment provided testimonial privilege was rejected), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
905 (1968); In re Taylor, 193 A.2d 181, 182 (Pa. 1963) (privilege asserted in grand jury
proceeding); Mooney, 269 N.Y. at 293, 199 N.E. at 415 (privilege asserted in grand jury
proceeding).
107 See id. (citing cases in which reporters claimed testimonial privilege prior to 1970).
108 See Mark Neubauer, Note, The Newsman's Privilege after Branzburg: The Case for a
Federal Shield Law, 24 UCLA L. REV. 160, 162-66 nn.13, 15 & 20 (1976) (increase in sub-
poenas direct result of Nixon Administration's efforts to subvert radical activity); see also
John E. Osborn, The Reporter's Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the Empirical Evidence
After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REV. 57, 62 n.24 (1985) (between
1968 and 1981, eighty cases arose wherein reporters asserted privilege).
109 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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privilege upon reporters to refuse to appear and testify before a
grand jury.110
B. Branzburg v. Hayes
Branzburg v. Hayes consolidated four cases 1 ' in which report-
ers witnessed criminal conduct by their confidential sources and
thereafter published articles pertaining to the illicit activities. 1 12
These reporters were later subpoenaed to appear before grand ju-
ries to disclose their sources in order to assist criminal investiga-
tions. 11 3 The journalists, relying on the "Freedom of the Press Pro-
vision" of the Constitution, claimed a privilege from disclosing the
identity of their sources, and refused to testify." 4 In a narrow de-
cision, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not
relieve a newspaper reporter of the duty to respond to a grand jury
subpoena and answer questions relevant to a criminal investiga-
tion.115 The Court reasoned that as long as harassment was not
110 Id. at 665. "The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear and
testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press guar-
anteed by the First Amendment." Id.
111 See Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408 U.S. 665
(1972); In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), affd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v.
Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971), affd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v. Pound, 461
S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), affd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
112 See Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1082 (New York Times reporter subpoenaed due to series of
articles written about Black Panthers); Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 297-98 (television reporter
subpoenaed to testify about Black Panthers' role in riots in New Bedford, Massachusetts);
Meigs, 503 S.W.2d at 748-49 (Branzburg subpoenaed based on article in which he specifi-
cally described illegal use of drugs); Pound, 461 S.W.2d at 345 (reporter Paul Branzburg, of
the Louisville Courier-Journal, described personal observation of production of hashish in
article).
113 See Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1082; Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 298; Pound, 461 S.W.2d at
345; Meig, 503 S.W.2d at 749.
114 Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1082. Mr. Caldwell refused to appear before the grand jury. Id.
The Ninth Circuit accepted the reporter's assertion of privilege and held that absent a
showing of a "compelling governmental interest" in the information sought, reporters were
protected from disclosure based on the First Amendment. Id. Paul Branzburg also refused
to appear before a grand jury. See Pound, 461 S.W.2d at 348. The Kentucky Supreme Court
ordered Branzburg to disclose his sources. Id. Paul Pappas appeared before the grand jury,
but refused to testify claiming a First Amendment privilege. See Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at
298. Similar to Branzburg, Pappas was required to disclose his sources. Id.
115 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 692. The Court stated it could not entertain the notion that
the First Amendment protected a newsman's agreement not to conceal the criminal activity
of his source, or evidence thereof, on the theory that it was better to write about crime than
do something about it. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on the role
of grand juries and the vital public interests they further. Id. at 686-88, 699-702. The Court
also found the reporters' claims regarding the burden that would be placed on the press if
such a privilege was not recognized unpersuasive. Id. at 692.
Justice William Powell submitted a separate concurring opinion, in which he proposed a
case-by-case balancing test. Id. at 708-710 (Powell, J., concurring). However, Justice Potter
Stewart, along with Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, dissented, and
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the state's underlying motive for requesting the information, the
grand jury had the right to request that a reporter testify.116
The facts of Branzburg were atypical of the ordinary situation
in which a reporter would gain access to confidential informa-
tion." 7 Normally, journalists report stories based on indirect-ac-
quired knowledge, unlike the Branzburg reporters who wrote
first-hand reports." 8 Although the Court held that the First
Amendment did not shield reporters from testifying regarding
their personal observations of a crime in grand jury proceed-
ings," 9 the Court's limited holding provided little insight into
whether the Constitution provided for a privilege in other con-
texts.'2 ° For example, the Court's plurality opinion failed to ad-
dress whether a First Amendment reporter's privilege would be
recognized in cases where reporters received information relating
to criminal activities of their sources, but did not actually witness
the events. 2 ' Similarly, the Court did not provide guidance as to
whether such a privilege would be available in defamation cases
where reporters were defendants or in other civil litigation where
reporters were called as nonparty witnesses.' 22
called for the recognition of a qualified journalist's privilege. Id. at 725, 743 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Lastly, Justice William Douglas, in a separate dissenting opinion, went a step
further and argued for an absolute reporter's privilege. Id. at 711 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 681, 707-08. The Branzburg Court recognized that reporters were entitled to
some First Amendment protection. Id. Specifically, the Court noted that "without some
protection for seeking out news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. Thus, if it
was found that a grand jury proceeding was conducted in bad faith and/or the sole impetus
in requesting the disclosure of confidential sources was to harass the press, the reporter
could invoke First Amendment protection. Id.
117 See Douglas H. Frazer, Note, Criminal Law: The Newsperson's Privilege in Grand
Jury Proceedings: An Argument for Uniform Recognition and Application, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 413, 426 (1984) (noting that privilege is more likely to be asserted in situa-
tion in which reporter has no first-hand knowledge of his source's crime as opposed to rela-
tively uncommon factual situation of Branzburg); see also Browne, supra note 106 (assert-
ing Branzburg plurality did not consider typical case in which confidential source divulges
his crime to reporter).
118 See Browne, supra note 106.
119 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668 (1972) (compelled disclosure not violative
of First Amendment).
120 See Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1972) (federal law on
question of compelled disclosure "at best ambiguous"), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973);
State v. Kiss, 700 P.2d 40, 45 (Idaho 1985) (Donaldson, C.J., concurring) (noting that after
Branzburg, "the federal constitutional status of the newsperson's privilege is anything but
clear").
121 See Browne, supra note 106. 'Neither the courts nor the federal or state legislators
have clearly defined a journalist's right to keep sources confidential." Id.
122 See Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 562 P.2d 791, 795 (Idaho 1977). In determin-
ing whether to adopt a reporter's privilege, in a civil context, the Caldero court explained
that it was without Supreme Court guidance on this subject. Id.
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C. Federal and State Support for the Reporter's Privilege
1. Federal Law
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision, circuit courts
have acknowledged a reporter's privilege.123 While the circuit
courts agree that the testimonial exception is not absolute, there
is disagreement as to the extent of protection permitted by the
privilege. 124 For example, some circuits have held that the privi-
lege may be invoked absent a confidentiality agreement, while
others afford limited protection to confidential information. 125
2. State Law
A substantial number of state courts have recognized some form
of constitutionally mandated reporter's privilege. 2 6 The scope of
123 See Browne, supra note 106. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth,
Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have all recognized a reporter's privilege. Id.; see
also LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.) (permitting
reporter's privilege with respect to confidential informants), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818
(1986); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983) (recognizing privilege in
criminal context); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (acknowledging new-
sgatherer's privilege in civil cases); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Inc., 633
F.2d 583, 585, 595-96 (1st Cir. 1980) (privilege recognized in libel action); United States v.
Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (recognizing reporter's privilege with respect
to confidential sources and unpublished information in criminal context), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1126 (1981); Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980) (recog-
nizing privilege only in cases in which information was received in confidence), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Silkwood v. Kerr-Mcgee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977)
(privilege permitted in civil case); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1975)
(permitting qualified reporter's privilege not to disclose sources in criminal proceedings),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Baker, 470 F.2d at 783 (recognizing privilege in civil ac-
tion); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992-93 & n.9 (8th Cir. 1972) (permitting privi-
lege in libel action).
For district decisions recognizing a newsgather's privilege, see McArdle v. Hunter, 7 Me-
dia L. Rep. (BNA) 2294, 2295 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (privilege recognized in civil proceeding);
Gulliver's Periodicals v. Charles Levy Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197, 1201-02 (N.D. Ill.
1978) (privilege recognized in civil action).
124 Compare Maughan v. NL Industries, 524 F. Supp. 93, 95 (D. D.C. 1981) (privilege
may be utilized irrespective of confidentiality) and Cutherberton, 630 F.2d at 147 (privilege
permitted absent confidentiality agreement) and United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp.
295, 296-97 (S.D. Fla. 1982) and Gulliver's Periodicals, 455 F. Supp. at 1203 (lack of confi-
dentiality immaterial in determining whether reporter may invoke privilege) and Altemose
Constr. v. Building & Constr. Trade Council, 443 F. Supp. 489, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (privi-
lege may be maintained when news sources are not confidential) with Knight-Ridder
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg, 70 N.Y.2d 151, 153, 511 N.E.2d 1116, 1117, 518 N.Y.S.2d
595, 596 (1987) (privilege may be invoked regarding confidential information only).
125 Compare Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., No. 92-16573, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16094, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 1987) (protection extends only to confidential
documents) with Shoen v. Shoen, No. 92-16573, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24685, at *19 (9th
Cir. Sept. 27, 1993) (holding journalist's privilege applies to reporter's resource materials
even in absence of confidentiality agreement).
126 See Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1302 (D. Fla. 1975) (qualified privilege
permitted in civil case); Gadsen County Times, Inc. v. Home, 426 So. 2d 1234, 1238 (Fla.
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the privilege differs from state to state. 127 For instance, Penn-
sylvania's journalist's privilege protects all documents that might
potentially provide evidence of a reporter's news sources, 128
whereas Maryland's privilege only protects the identity of the
sources. '
29
Where state judiciaries have failed to act, twenty-six state legis-
latures have enacted statutes granting newsgatherers a privilege
of nondisclosure. 30  These statutes are commonly known as
"shield laws" because they "shield" reporters from contempt cita-
tions in the event they refuse to testify.13 ' The extent of protection
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (privilege permitted in civil and criminal cases); Dallas Oil & Gas, Inc.
v. Mouer, 533 S.W.2d 70, 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (privilege recognized in civil context);
State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254, 271 (Vt. 1974) (privilege recognized in criminal context);
Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429, 430 (Va. 1974) (privilege recognized in criminal
proceeding); Zelenka v. Wisconsin, 266 N.W.2d 279, 286-87 (Wis. 1978) (privilege adopted
in criminal case).
127 Compare Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, 70 N.Y.2d at 153, 511 N.E.2d at 1117,
N.Y.S.2d at 596 (holding New Yorl privilege does not extend protection to non-confidential
sources of information) and Marketos v. American Employers Ins. Co., 460 N.W.2d 272,
281 (Mich. 1990) (no protection for confidential materials) with Gulliver's Periodicals, 455
F. Supp. at 1203 (lack of confidentiality immaterial in determining whether reporter may
invoke privilege) and Altemose Constr., 443 F. Supp. at 491 (privilege may be maintained
when news sources not confidential).
128 See Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating all non-
published portions of source's statement protected even though identity of primary source
of information known).
129 See Tofani v. State, 465 A.2d 413 (Md. 1983) (Maryland's journalist's privilege pro-
tects identity of news sources and not information obtained therefrom).
130 See Browne, supra note 106. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Dela-
ware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas have passed legislation to protect report-
ers from compelled disclosure. Id.
A few states which have been unsuccessful in codifying a reporter's privilege, have con-
strued their state constitutions as providing protection for reporters against compelled dis-
closure. See State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499, 502 (N.H. 1982) (newsreporter's privilege based on
Part I, Article 22 of New Hampshire constitution); Zelenka, 266 N.W.2d at 286 (Wisconsin
constitution interpreted as permitting privilege).
131 See Frazer, supra note 117, at 415. Congress has periodically proposed but never
enacted a federal shield law. Id.; see also H.R. 6213, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 172,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 870, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 1311, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971); S. 3552, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
The Attorney General has issued general guidelines pertaining to issuing a subpoena to
a member of the news media. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1979) (codifying Attorney General
guidelines). The guideline provide:
Negotiations with the media shall be pursued in all cases in which a subpoena is
contemplated. These negotiations should attempt to accommodate the interests of the
trial or grand jury with the interests of the media. Where the nature of the investiga-
tion permits, the government should make clear what its needs are ... as well as its
willingness to respond to the particular problems of the media.
Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(d) (1979) (requiring express authorization from Attorney
General if negotiations fail).
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provided by these statutory privileges vary from state to state.
132
Although New Jersey's and Maryland's shield laws have been in-
terpreted as providing an absolute privilege to reporters, the ma-
jority of states that have enacted shield laws have granted report-
ers only a qualified privilege. 133 California's statute is unique,
since it does not directly provide reporters with a privilege, but
instead, provides journalists immunity from contempt citations. 134
3. The New York Shield Law
As the largest information center in the United States, New
York provides extensive protection to newsgatherers. 135  New
York's shield law was enacted prior to the Branzburg decision and
protects newsgathering and a reporter's right to disseminate in-
formation to the public without fear of compelled disclosure.
136
Section (b) of New York's shield law grants professional journal-
ists an absolute exemption from contempt proceedings if they re-
fuse to testify regarding their confidential sources or information
obtained therefrom. 137 This exemption applies in civil, criminal,
132 See Browne, supra note 106 (pointing out lack of uniformity among state shield laws);
see also Jamerson v. Anderson Newspapers, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 1243, 1247 (Ind. 1984) (shield
laws differ as to scope of protection and class of parties which may invoke protection). Com-
pare New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 796 P.2d 811, 821 (Cal. 1990) (shield law
protects unpublished information) and Steaks Unlimited, 623 F.2d at 278-79 (interpreting
Pennsylvania's shield law as protecting unpublished information such as "out-takes") with
Tofani, 465 A.2d at 417 (Maryland's shield law only protects identity of news sources).
Compare Newton v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 109 F.R.D. 522, 528 (Nev. 1985) (Nevada's
shield law grants qualified privilege of non-disclosure with no libel exception) with TENN.
CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980) (privilege must be divested in defamation suit).
133 Compare MD. CODE ANN. § 2 (1971) (absolute on its face) and N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84(a)-21 (West Supp. 1984-85) and Jamerson, 469 N.E.2d at 1246 ("Indiana's shield
law, confers without a doubt, an absolute privilege on the news media.") and Maressa v.
New Jersey Monthly, 445 A.2d 376, 379 (N.J. 1982) (holding newsperson's privilege in civil
action absolute); with PA. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (1992) (qualified privilege) and TENN. CODE
ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980) (shield law provides qualified privilege).
134 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1983) (original provision
for reporter's shield law); Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625, 626 (Cal. 1984). Since
California's shield law provides reporters with immunity rather than a privilege, courts
may use other sanctions against reporters for nondisclosure. Id.
135 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS § 79-h (McKinney 1993).
136 Id.; see People v. Marahan, 81 Misc. 2d 637, 647, 368 N.Y.S.2d 685, 696 (Sup. Ct.
Crim. T. Kings County 1975) (stating New York's shield law was enacted to protect against
compelled disclosure of confidential sources). See generally Richard Rosen, Comment, A
Call for Legislative Response to New York's Narrow Interpretation of the Newsperson's Priv-
ilege in Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 285, 295 (1988)
(discussing legislators' intent in creating New York's shield law).
137 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS § 79-h(b) (McKinney 1993). This section provides in pertinent part:
no professional journalist or newscaster.., shall be adjudged in contempt by any court
in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding... for refusing or failing to disclose
any news obtained or received in confidence or the identity of the source of any such
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and grand jury proceedings and may be invoked if two prerequi-
sites are satisfied. 138 Specifically, the information or its sources
must be disclosed to the reporters under a "cloak of confidential-
ity,"1 39 and the information must come into the journalists' posses-
sion in the course of their capacity as newsgatherers. 140 In addi-
tion, section (c) provides reporters with a qualified exemption from
contempt for refusing to divulge nonconfidential, unpublished in-
formation or sources. 14 1
D. Defeating the Privilege
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the reporter's privilege may only be overcome upon a
showing of a "compelling interest" in the information requested.142
In determining whether a "compelling interest" exists, the Second
Circuit utilizes a stringent tripartite test.143 The litigant seeking
news coming into such person's possession in the course of gathering or obtaining news
for publication.
Id.
138 Id.; see Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc. v. Greenberg, 70 N.Y.2d 151, 155-56, 511
N.E.2d 1116, 1117-18, 518 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596 (1987) (privilege invoked only when confiden-
tial information obtained during newsgathering).
139 See Don King Prod., Inc. v. Douglas, 131 F.R.D. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (New York's
shield law protects information gathered by reporters under cloak of confidentiality).
140 See von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987). In order to successfully
invoke protection of New York shield law, journalist must show information was received
in the course of newsgathering. Id.
141 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS § 79-h(c) (McKinney 1993). This section provides in pertinent part:
no professional journalist or newscaster... shall be adjudged in contempt by any court
in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding... for refusing or failing to disclose
any unpublished news obtained or prepared by a journalist or newscaster in the course
of gathering or obtaining news as provided in subdivision (b) of this section, or the
source of any such news, where such news was not obtained or received in confidence,
unless the party seeking such news has made a clear and specific showing that the
news is (i) highly material and relevant; (ii) critical or necessary to the maintenance of
the party's claim, defense or proof of an issue material thereto; and (iii) is not obtaina-
ble from any alternative source.
Id.
142 Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
966 (1973). This test was adopted to reflect a paramount interest in the maintenance of a
vigorous, aggressive, and independent press capable of participating in robust, unfettered
debate, over controversial matters, an interest which has been a primary concern of the
First Amendment. Id.
143 See United States v. Cutler, No. 93-6160, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24752, at *6-7 (2d
Cir. Sept. 23, 1993) (reaffirming that three-prong test articulated in Burke is proper stan-
dard in cases where litigant seeks to defeat reporter's privilege); United States v. Aponte-
Vega, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2202 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying disclosure due to govern-
ment's failure to satisfy three-prong test); United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 154
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying three-prong standard to ensure media work product disclosed
only when necessary to ensure fair judicial process); see also United States v. Burke, 700
F.2d 70, 76-77 (2d Cir.) (test may be applied in both criminal and civil proceedings), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); Baker, 470 F.2d at 783-85 (test applied in civil context); In re
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disclosure must clearly and specifically demonstrate that the
materials sought are "highly material and relevant, necessary or
critical to the maintenance of the plaintiffs claim, and not obtain-
able from any other available sources."" This standard of review
has been followed by several other federal and state courts. 145
The validity of the Second Circuit's test was recently challenged
in United States v. Cutler.146 This criminal contempt proceeding
arose from the case in which Bruce Cutler served as defense coun-
sel in United States v. Gotti.147 Because of the publicity surround-
ing the Gotti trial, Judge I. Leo Glasser instituted a "gag order."148
In defiance of this order, Cutler made various comments to the
media concerning his client and the trial. 14 As a result of violat-
ing the gag order, Cutler was charged with contempt.150 In prepa-
Petroleum Products, 680 F.2d 5, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (identity of reporter's
sources may only be disclosed upon satisfying three-prong test); accord N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
§ 79-h(c) (McKinney 1993) (identical test codified with respect to nonconfidential informa-
tion); O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 527, 523 N.E.2d 277, 283, 528
N.Y.S. 2d 1, 7 (1988) (same test applies under New York constitution).
144 Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 550-51 (2d Cir. 1958). This test was first articulated
in a suit brought by Judy Garland. Id. The case arose when Marie Torre, a reporter for the
Herald Tribune, wrote an article describing the actress as overweight. Id. Torre attributed
the statement to an unidentified CBS official. Id. Garland sued CBS and sought to depose
Torre to determine the identity of the official who made the comment. Id. Torre refused to
testify, claiming a First Amendment privilege. Id. In an effort to ensure that the reporter's
First Amendment rights were not infringed, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit applied a three-prong test to determine if the plaintiff had a compelling and
overriding interest in the information sought. Id. In short, the Garland test demanded
relevancy; necessity; and exhaustion of alternative sources. Id. Ultimately, the Second Cir-
cuit compelled disclosure after concluding that Garland satisfied all three requirements.
Id.
145 See Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 713-15 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (test applied in civil ac-
tion); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1980)
(test applied in libel action); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir.
1977) (stating reporter has privilege to resist requests to reveal sources, unless litigant
seeking disclosure satisfies three-prong test); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 631 (D.C. Cir.)
(test applied in libel action), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
146 United States v. Cutler, No. 93-6160, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24752, at *10, *17 (2d
Cir. Sept. 23, 1993).
147 United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 552, 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). John Gotti was
charged and convicted of murder and racketeering. Id.
148 United States v. Cutler, 815 F. Supp. 599, 601-05 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Judge I. Leo Glas-
ser warned counsel on three occassions to comply with Rule 7 of the Criminal Rules of the
District Court, which prohibits attorneys from making certain extrajudicial statements
during a pending case. Id.
149 See Edward Frost, Hearing on Cutler's Contempt Charge, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 31, 1992, at
1, col. 1 (Cutler accused federal prosecutors of having "a personal vendetta" against Gotti
and called case against Gotti "an example of McCarthyism"); see also Andrew Blum, Just
What Did Attorney Say that Was Such a Problem?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 18, 1993, at 26 (Cutler
stated that government witnesses were "bums" and "Gotti is loved more than anyone else
in the city").
150 See United States v. Cutler, 796 F. Supp. 710, 710-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). In November
of 1991, Judge Glasser appointed special counsel to prosecute Cutler for intentionally and
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ration for his defense, Cutler subpoenaed numerous reporters in
order to obtain their unpublished notes and related testimony re-
garding interviews he gave during the Gotti trial.151 The reporters
claimed a privilege and moved to quash the subpoenas. 152 The
District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the mo-
tions and ordered the reporters to comply.'" 3 The journalists re-
fused and were found in contempt of court.-5 4 The district court
stayed the imposition of punishment pending an expedited
appeal. 155
On appeal, the Second Circuit applied the three-prong test ar-
ticulated in United States v. Burke.' 56 Cutler alleged that the Sec-
ond Circuit test should no longer be utilized in view of the dicta in
Branzburg v. Hayes, which suggested that such a stringent test
was not required.'5 7 Cutler also relied upon the recent Supreme
Court decision in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC. 158 In this
decision, the Supreme Court interpreted Branzburg as rejecting
the notion that the First Amendment required a special showing
of necessity before a reporter could be compelled to disclose confi-
dential information.1 5
9
willfully violating the court order and Rule 7. Id.
151 See United States v. Cutler, NO. 93-6160, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24752, at *5 (2d Cir.
Sept. 23, 1993); Daniel Wise, Arguments Set on Legality of Subpoenas; Gotti Lawyer De-
manding Notes from 13 Reporters, N.Y.L.J., July 16, 1993, at 1, col. 1 ("Mr. Cutler claims to
need both the reporters and their notebooks to demonstrate the context in which his re-
marks were made.").
152 Cutler, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24752, at *8 (reporters moved to quash on ground that
the subpoenas "contravened the reporter's qualified privilege").
153 Id.
154 Id. The reporters were willing to testify as to "the substance" of the articles, but re-
fused to disclose confidential sources, or to produce notes or other unpublished materials
unless directed to do so by the Second Circuit. Id. The district court rejected the reporters
offer and were fined. Id.; see Andrew Blum, Free Speech Brawl, NAT'L L.J., July 12, 1993, at
6. "Held in contempt were Daily News Reporters Jerry Capeci and Tom Robbins; New York
Post reporters Karen Philips, James Nolan and Kevin McLaughlin; New York Times re-
porter Selwyn Raab and Arnold Lubash; Newsday reporters Peter Bowles, Kevin McCoy
and Anthony DeStefano; as well as CBS Inc. and Fox Television's station WNYW." Id.
155 Cutler, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24752, at *8.
156 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983).
157 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679 (1972) (rejecting reporters' contention that
three-part test must be satisfied before disclosure compelled).
158 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
159 Id. at 201. In Univ. of Pennsylvania, a Wharton School of Business professor was
denied tenure. Id. She sought disclosure of peer review materials in order to show that she
was denied tenure due to racial and sexual discrimination. Id. The university claimed an
"academic freedom" privilege of non-disclosure. Id. The Court refused to recognize defend-
ant's asserted privilege. Id. at 182. The Court noted that the plaintiff was not required to
make a "specific reason for disclosure," beyond a showing of relevance to compel disclosure.
Id. at 193.
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The Second Circuit rejected Cutler's arguments and applied the
three-prong test. 6 0 The Second Circuit found that the information
Cutler sought pertaining to the interviews he gave as highly mate-
rial and relevant, as well as critical to Cutler's claim since the re-
porters' notes and testimony were "probably the only significant
proof regarding his asserted criminal behavior." 16 1 Because Cutler
satisfied the three-prong test, the Court permitted disclosure. 62
The Second Circuit was correct in reaffirming the three-prong
test as the proper standard in reporter privilege cases, since each
aspect of the test serves to protect the confidentiality of journal-
ists' sources. In particular, the materiality requirement protects
the news media, by requiring that the litigant seeking disclosure
have a strong interest in the information sought, and is not merely
trying to obtain information which may or may not be relevant to
the investigation. 63 Moreover, because the litigant seeking disclo-
sure will, in the majority of the cases, have a rational basis for
requesting information from reporters, the "necessary and criti-
cal" requirement is a demanding burden on the plaintiff, and
thereby safeguards against unnecessary infringement of report-
ers' constitutional rights.'6 4 Finally, the third aspect of the test
provides additional protection to the news media by requiring the
plaintiff to make a special showing that the sources or information
sought are unidentifiable or unaccessible by other means. 6 '
160 United States v. Cutler, No. 93-6160, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24752, at *10, *17-20 (2d
Cir. Sept. 23, 1993). The court explained:
The law in this Circuit is clear that to protect the important interests of reporters and
the public in preserving the confidentiality of journalists' sources, disclosure may be
ordered only upon a clear and specific showing that the information is: highly material
and relevant, necessary or critical to the maintenance of the claim, and not obtainable
from other available sources.
Id. at *10.
161 Id.
162 Id. at *20. Moreover, the Court found that such evidence was "available only from the
reporters and [television] stations." Id. The Second Circuit did not, however, find that Cut-
ler was entitled to the production of reporters' testimony and notes regarding comments by
government officials regarding John Gotti and his trial. Id.
163 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
164 See id. (government must prove information sought from reporters is clearly relevant
to the grand jury investigation in order to avoid 'needless injury to First Amendment
values").
165 See Riley v. Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 716 (3d Cir. 1979) (reporter's privilege may not be
defeated without "strong showing by those seeking to elicit the information that there is no
other source for the information requested"); Dangerfield v. Star Editorial, Inc., 817 F.
Supp. 833, 838 (C.D. Cal. 1993) ('a showing that a plaintiff has exhausted all other possible
sources is more protective of journalists' First Amendment rights"); see also Frazer, supra
note 117, at 431 (asserting exhaustion requirement attempts to avoid First Amendment
confrontation).
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E. The Effect of Compelled Disclosure on the Press
Because journalists rely predominantly on confidential sources
for their news stories, the importance of a reporter's privilege is
obvious. 166 Without a reporter's privilege, a journalist will be
faced with a troublesome dilemma. 167 In the event of a subpoena,
reporters will encounter the prospect of being charged with con-
tempt or divulging their sources at the expense of their profes-
sional ethics 68 and reputations.1
69
Furthermore, the absence of a reporter's privilege will have a
chilling effect on newsgathering 170 and undermine the press's role
as a public "watchdog." 7 ' Without assurances that their identities
will be kept confidential, potential informants will be deterred
from coming forward.' 7 2 As sources "dry up," the effectiveness of
166 See Osborn, supra note 108, at 75. As many as 72% of journalists believe their effec-
tiveness as newsgatherers would be impaired without confidential sources Id. Numerous
affidavits submitted by journalists convinced the district court that the absence of a re-
porter's privilege would seriously hamper newsreporter's ability to gather,analyze and pub-
lish news. Id. For example, Walter Cronkite stated in his affidavit: "In doing my work, I
(and those who assist me) depend constantly on information, ideas, leads and opinions re-
ceived in confidence." Id..
167 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 731 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (without constitutional pro-
tection, reporters placed in troublesome position of "telling all" or going to jail).
168 See G. BiRD & F. MERWIN, THE PRESS AND SOCIETY 592 (1971). The American News-
paper Guild's code of ethics provides: "newspaperman shall refuse to reveal confidences or
disclose sources of confidential information in court or before other judicial or investigating
bodies." Id.
169 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S 665, 731 (1972) (asserting compelled disclosure
would adversely affect journalists' credibility).
170 See Frazer, supra note 117, at 414. Mr. Frazer comments:
The news media experiences a chilling effect when a reporter testifies about confiden-
tial sources. Not only does such testimony inhibit confidential sources from talking to
the media, but because reporters also fear revealing their confidential contacts, such
testimony diminishes the zeal with which newspersons investigate matters of acute
public interest.
Id.; see also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693. The plurality conceded that compelling reporters
to disclose their sources would have a chilling effect on newsgathering. Id. However, the
Court did not believe this "chilling effect" would be substantial. Id.
171 See Rosen, supra note 136, at 295 (asserting long-term repercussion of protecting
only mechanical processes of newsgathering and not news itself undermines press role as
watchdog of government behavior); see also David J. Onorato, Note, A Press Privilege for
the Worst of Times, 75 GEO. L. REV. 361, 361 (1986) (compelled disclosure threatens press's
ability to perform its watchdog role).
172 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (absence of constitutional
reporter's privilege will deter sources from revealing information); James A. Guest & Alan
L. Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing their Sources, 64 Nw. U.
L. REv. 18, 44-46 (1969) (absence of reporter's privilege inhibits free flow of information by
deterring informants from communicating with press and press from seeking out informa-
tion for dissemination); Note, Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98
HAav. L. REV. 1450, 1601 (1985) (compulsory disclosure restricts confidential communica-
tions between reporters and sources).
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reporters will undoubtedly be impaired. 173 The looming threat of
compelled disclosure will also force the media to temper its reports
and shy away from investigative reporting. 174 Without the protec-
tion of confidentiality, the news media will inevitably become self-
censoring. 175 In the final analysis, this ruinous effect on the dis-
semination of news will not only infringe upon the freedom of the
press,' 76 but also adversely affect the freedom of the United States
public177 because the general public relies upon the news to make
value judgments and informed decisions. 178
F. Recommendations
The Supreme Court's position in Branzburg failed to take the
above ramifications into account. Although judicial decisions and
shield laws provide some protection to reporters, 79 no uniform
privilege exists.'8 0 Moreover, the existing privileges created by ju-
173 Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972) ("the threat to a news-
man of being charged with contempt and of being imprisoned for failing to disclose his
information or its sources can significantly reduce his ability to gather vital information");
see also Rosen, supra note 136, at 295 (asserting compelled disclosure will undermine
newsreporters ability to disseminate news to public).
174 See Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 1970). "[Ilt is not unrea-
sonable to expect journalists everywhere to temper their reporting so as to reduce the
probability that they will be required to submit to interrogation." Id.
175 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S 665, 731 (1972) ("when governmental officials pos-
sess an unchecked power to compel newsmen to disclose information received in confidence,
... uncertainty about exercise of the power will lead to 'self-censorship'"); see also Zurcher
v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 573 (1978) (noting prospect of loosing access to confidential
sources may cause reporters to engage in self-censorship).
176 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1085 ("the very concept of
free press requires that the news media be accorded a measure of autonomy; that they
should be free to be pursue their own investigations to their own ends without fear of gov-
ernmental interference.. ."); Rosen, supra note 136, at 286 (asserting that press independ-
ent public informant entitled to be unburdened by government).
177 Baker, 470 F.2d at 785 ("It is axiomatic, and a principle fundamental to our constitu-
tional way of life, that where the press remains free so to will a people remain free."); see
also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 726 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (denial of newsreporter's privilege
deprives public from obtaining information needed to "run the affairs of the Nation in an
intelligent way."); Frazer, supra note 117, at 441 (denial of constitutional reporter's privi-
lege frustrates journalists' ability to gather news and jeopardizes "the public's right to
know").
178 See Browne, supra note 106, at 739-40 ("If fewer sources reveal information to the
press, a less informed public will result. A less informed public lowers society's ability to
make responsible choices about issues concerning the public's welfare."); see also Zerilli v.
Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (without unrestricted press, society is less able to
make informed decisions).
179 See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text (discussing cases and statutes adopt-
ing reporter's privilege).
180 See id. (comparing extent of protection offered in various jurisdictions); see also Fra-
zer, supra note 117, at 441 (arguing in support of adoption of constitutional qualified
privilege).
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dicial decisions and statutes fail to rise to the level of protection
available under the United States Constitution. 181 Therefore, the
Supreme Court should expressly adopt a reporter's privilege in or-
der to ensure the free flow of information and the constitutional
rights of the news media. 182 In so doing, the Court should utilize
the three-prong test adopted by the Second Circuit."13
The Supreme Court should employ the Second Circuit's ap-
proach for several reasons. First, the employment of an identical
standard of review in civil, criminal, and grand jury proceedings
at the federal and state levels, would ensure all parties consistent
and predictable results.184 Second, courts have traditionally been
reluctant to permit First Amendment rights to be infringed upon
without a strong showing of a "compelling interest." 8 5 Therefore,
the three-prong test is entirely consistent with the standard of re-
view utilized in other First Amendment cases.' 86 Third, the Sec-
ond Circuit standard properly balances the interests at stake.
Specifically, the test fully considers the constitutional interests of
the news media, while at the same time taking into account liti-
gants' interests in gathering evidence pertinent to the defense or
prosecution of their cases.187 Finally, the Second Circuit approach
promotes fairness and justice by permitting the litigant seeking
disclosure to defeat the reporter's privilege, provided all three re-
181 See Browne, supra note 106 (asserting courts' strict construction of shield laws pro-
vide "little in the way of protection for reporters"); Frazer, supra note 117, at 434 (noting
that shield laws "insufficient substitute" for recognition of constitutional privilege).
182 See Browne, supra note 106, at 739 (asserting Supreme Court should establish jour-
nalistic privilege); Frazer, supra note 117, at 442 ("The reporter's first amendment privi-
lege is a constitutionally derived right,... that deserves judicial acceptance.").
183 See supra note 143 (citing Second Circuit cases utilizing three-prong approach); see
also Frazer, supra note 117, at 415-16 (application of three-prong test not necessary in
states where shield laws confer greater protection to reporters).
184 See supra notes 180-82.
185 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (recognizing compelling state interest
may justify limiting First Amendment freedoms); see also Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) (state must show compelling interest for
disclosure); Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 562 P.2d 791, 791 (Idaho 1977) (Donaldson,
J., dissenting) (emphasizing that in every case involving infringement of First Amendment
rights, courts must determine whether compelling interest justifying infringement exists).
186 See id.
187 See Frazer, supra note 117, at 430-31 (three-prong test equitably balances rights of
both parties); see also Riley v. Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 716 (3d Cir. 1979) (three-part test
strikes "delicate balance" between assertion of privilege and interests of litigants seeking
information); Pankratz v. Dist. Court of Denver, 600 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Colo. 1980) (Rovira,
J., concurring) (three-prong test properly considers "the needs of a free press to investigate
and the needs of the state to have the testimony of every person available in judicial
proceedings").
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quirements are satisfied.1 8 8
CONCLUSION
While it has been accepted as a general proposition that the
public is entitled to every person's evidence, there are particular
relationships which, by their very nature, demand special treat-
ment. After careful examination of two such relationships, it is
evident that the need for both a parent-child and reporter's privi-
lege is paramount. Without protection from the courts, the confi-
dential communications between parents and children, as well as
reporters and informants, will be destroyed.
Yolanda L. Ayala & Thomas C. Martyn
188 Baker v. F & F Invest., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972). The Baker court noted there
would be rare instances where the First Amendment interests of reporters would be re-
quired to yield to the interests of the public. Id. In such cases, the reporter's privilege would
be defeated in the interests of justice. Id.
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